The years following the Second World War are those of greatest economic growth in Europe. If the countries of the Iberian Peninsula, neutral in the conflict and ruled by dictatorial regimes, enjoyed that growth and had participated in the convergence phenomenon, Ireland, also neutral but democratic, was not able to converge to the developed world. Since 1973, with petroleum crashes, the process of growth has slowed in Europe, but it was only after 1985 that Ireland began to grow at impressive rates. We review, in an economic history perspective, the implications of the institutional environment and the economic policy decisions. We also address the consequences and plausible explanations for the different growth paths of those countries and revisit the puzzle of slow Irish growth until the middle eighties.
Introduction
Ireland, Portugal and Spain provide a good case to study economic growth because they all had a low per capita income in the 1930s, followed by quite different growth paths:
Portugal and Spain experienced fast growth until 1973, slowing after that date, while Ireland's fastest growth period was after 1985. In this paper we will examine these paths side by side, while citing the range of literature addressing the subject.
We review, in an economic history perspective, the implications of the institutional environment and the economic policy decisions: political regimes and institutions, industrial policy, trade policy and fiscal and monetary policy. We also address the consequences and plausible explanations for the different growth paths of those countries and revisit the puzzle of slow Irish growth until the middle eighties, suggesting some explanations for the fact.
In Section 2 we describe, on a comparative basis, the different periods of economic growth in the three countries, paying special attention to the possible relationship between policies, institutions and economic growth. Then, in Section 3, we review the main growth accounting studies that compare these countries, trying to distinguish the main sources of different growth rates. Next, in Section 4, we re-address the well-known puzzle about Irish growth. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude. With this, we wish to create a comparable body of reference regarding growth paths over the greater part of the twentieth century in these countries.
2.
The economic history of three peripheral countries in Europe: Ireland,
Portugal and Spain

Political and Economic instability (1930s and 40s)
The late twenties and early thirties were years of disruption in all these countries. Portugal and Spain faced a political transition to dictatorial regimes, although this transition was much more pronounced in Spain, with its Civil War . But the new regimes in the Iberian countries had the same economic motivation: to solve the economic and financial problems of the countries and their governments. Ireland had a democratic regime but gained political independence from the United Kingdom during the twenties, going through difficult social traumas in the process (César das Neves (1996) , Ó Gráda e K.
O' Rourke (1996) , Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996) ).
Portugal and Spain adopted a new form of labor organization aimed at avoiding social conflict. The new Corporations were organizations that tried to reconcile employees' and employers' needs and ambitions. In Spain the Ley basica de trabajo (Basic Labor Law ) (1939) forbade labor unions and enforced affiliation in the state organizations. In Portugal the Ordem Corporativa 1 (Corporative Order) forbade strikes and lockout and fomented the direct negotiation between employers and employees. Ireland had free labor organizations.
A summary of the main policies followed during the period in analysis is made in Table 1 . It can be said that the consequences of the Great Depression were more harmful to Ireland (the smallest and the most open economy of the three) than to Spain, and worse in Spain than in Portugal. The Spanish government implemented a fiscal contraction at the time of the crisis that is thought to have worsened the situation. In Portugal, Salazar's government had maintained the belief in budget equilibrium, which led to a slight decrease in public expenditures. However, simultaneously, it lowered interest rates, which benefited investment and public deficit (Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996) , Valério (1982) ).
In response to the world trade crisis, these countries adopted protective measures that included industrial conditioning 2 , high tariffs, quotas and restriction to foreign direct investment (FDI) 3 . The industrial conditioning laws restricted the entry and localization of enterprises to those authorized by the government. On one hand, this avoided the usual mergers and acquisitions in a free entry economy. On the other hand, it did not favor technological progress, which is often linked with the competitive environment.
Nevertheless, some theses point out that industrial conditioning might have had an important role in markets where excessive entry occurred, possibly promoting mergers and acquisitions. Authors who promote this view also argue that the contestability of concentrated markets took place. Nevertheless, the incumbent firms usually did not promote innovation and development in order to deter new entrants, but argued with excessive capacity (Confraria (1992) ), although some cases of innovation and process or quality improvement might have occurred.
Aside from the domestic protectionism, firms in all three countries were protected by high tariffs, and in the Portuguese case also by the Colonial Act (Acto Colonial, 1930) , aimed at keeping the colonial market free of foreign firms. (Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, 1997) , with the greatest decline being between 1929 and 1933. According to Kindleberger (1973) , the volume of trade in 1933 was only 33% of that in 1929. About protective measures taken after the Great Depression, see also Aldcroft (1987, pp.33 and 45) .
Industria Nacional (Law for the organization and defense of national Industry), in Spain and the Manufactures Acts, in Ireland, strongly limited foreign investment.
There is, however, a remarkable distinction between the strategy of Spain and Ireland, on the one hand, and Portugal on the other: the government intervention. In Portugal the government did not intervene in the industrialization process until 1945 (Lains, 1994 privately owned firms, which could not benefit from scale economies (Braña et al. (1984) , César das Neves (1994 Neves ( , 1996 , Harrison (1978) , Leddin and Walsh (1998) , Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996) , Marques (1988) ).
The Second World War: Consequences and Development Strategies
This is a period of supply problems in these countries, a situation which drove the governments to strive for self-sufficiency. With the end of the conflict, Spain ended up with no supplier of modern technology, not only because of the collapse of its former supplier (Nazi Germany), but also because of the UN embargo (1946) . This fact, coupled with a depreciation of the national currency (Peseta), prevented Spain from importing intermediate goods that were needed to implement the import substitution strategy. In Ireland, the problem was not so different. The main supplier of technology (the United Kingdom) was now a destroyed country. Besides this, the controlled prices of agricultural goods in the UK had reduced the income of Irish peasants and their production, as well.
Portugal had quite a different story to tell: although its economy felt some technology needs, its exports (mainly minerals and textiles) rose considerably during the war, increasing the accumulation of capital in the economy (Braña, Buesa and Molero (1984) , César das Neves (1994 , Harrison (1978) , Leddin and Walsh (1998) , Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996) , Marques (1988) , Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) ).
The three countries felt inflationary pressures toward the end of the forties, caused by the restrictions on the supply side. While Portugal used its gold and foreign currency reserves accumulated during the war to reach equilibrium in markets with excessive demand in order to decrease inflation, Spain and Ireland liberalized international trade, permitting a gradual increase in imports in the former and a more significant increase in imports in the latter. However, some thought that the Anglo-Irish Commercial Agreement (1948), which opened the English market to the Irish agricultural goods, was the answer to all Irish problems. On the contrary, the agreement proved disastrous to Ireland, through the evolution of terms of trade (César das Neves (1996) , Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) and Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996) ).
Responses to domestic stress also differed. The Spanish government abandoned its autarky strategy and tried to implement an export-oriented model of industrialization (Delgado (1987) , Harrison (1978) , Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996) ). On the contrary, Portugal and Ireland did not promote exports. Portugal embarked on an import-substitution model of industrialization, based on the accumulated gold and currency reserves (Mateus (1998) , Rosas (1990) ). Ireland believed that the core of its problems resided in the agricultural sector, leading the government to raise tariffs and implement other protectionist measures (Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) ).
A remarkable difference between the Iberian countries and Ireland was that this country promoted explicit Keynesian policies, giving rise to social investment in schools, hospitals and subsidized housing policies. In fact, Ireland maintained a rate of social investment quite high for that time, while the Portuguese government promoted nominal equilibrium, as it thought that it was the best environment for investment (César das Neves (1996) , Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) , Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996) (Lains (1994) ). While in Portugal the main motivation to
Planning was the need to implement the new industrial policy, in Ireland it was the need to manage the funds from the Marshall Plan. The first planning experience was not entirely effective but did advance the move against the protectionist policies and toward the adoption of export-oriented policies (Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) ). Spain, which had begun its industrial program earlier, did not need to implement planning because it did not benefit from the Marshall Plan.
Between 1950 and 1960 there were more significant structural changes in the Iberian countries than in Ireland. The most significant indicators were the acceleration of GDP and productivity growth, the increase in investment and decreased inflation (which fell below the two-digit threshold), the decreasing share of agricultural production, and employment in the total stocks. Ireland suffered from massive emigration, and this decade was a disaster in terms of economic growth (César das Neves, ( ), Harrison, (1978 , Leddin and Walsh, (1998), Merigo, (1982) , Prados de La Escosura and Sanz, (1996) ).
The two Iberian countries had restructured their industrial conditioning systems (Portugal in 1952 and Spain in 1963) . The efforts were to streamline the bureaucratic process and urge the decision maker to focus on the technical aspects to guarantee a minimum scale.
Spain created a more effective incentive policy with the implementation of preferential localization zones, industrial polygons, fiscal and economic benefits, restricted discretionary administrative decisions, and privatization of its state-owned sector (Braña, Buesa and Molero (1984) , César das Neves (1996)).
The sixties were the years of openness to trade and of integration in international markets, while the most respectable economic institutions (World Bank, OECD and NBER)
criticized the import-substitution policies (Mateus (1998) Leddin and Walsh (1998) ).
There were some remarkable structural differences between Portugal and Spain. While
Portugal promoted nominal and real equilibrium (in part helped by emigration and emigrants' remittances), Spain had serious problems with its inflation rate and its external deficit. To solve its problems this country sought help from the USA and promoted a Stabilization Plan (1959), which was quite effective (César das Neves (1996), Prados de La Escosura and Sanz (1996)).
Portugal witnessed high emigration for social and political reasons and had to contend with the Colonial War (1961-74), which was a great financial burden (César das Neves (1994)).
The openness of the economies, the FDI, and some structural reforms permitted annual average per capita growth rates of 7% in Spain and Portugal and 4% in Ireland. What is puzzling is why Ireland did not experience faster growth when the conditions were theoretically favorable and quite similar to its Iberian counterparts.
5 Openness ratio =(IMPORTS+EXPORTS)/GDP.
2.3.
Crisis and Integration: the Celtic "tiger"
In the seventies the world was affected by oil shocks, which seriously damaged nonproducers. In the same period Iberian countries faced the political transition to democratic regimes, which exacerbated the difficulties.
After a non-violent transition, the structural debilities of the Spanish economy were the same as before because lobby pressures had stopped the liberalization. In the mid-seventies Spain had a centralized economy. Although the transition in Portugal was also peaceful, the revolution period had profound consequences on the economic structure of the country.
In fact, a great share of the productive sector was nationalized in 1975. In addition, the rapid decolonization caused massive immigration: nearly half a million people returned to Portugal, placing tremendous pressures on the society (César das Neves (1996), Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996), Merigo (1982) ). These factors are thought to have influenced a higher volatility in economic growth rates in Portugal than in Spain during this period (Amaral (1996) ).
The economic adjustment to democratic regimes triggered a change in industrial and earnings structures, through the beginning of the state social security system and through the introduction of the minimum wage and controlled prices. These reforms and the first oil shock worsened the public and external deficits in the two countries.
Weak governments following the Portuguese Revolução dos Cravos and during the
Spanish transición agreed on the creation of very rigid labor laws. Nevertheless, labor market rigidities led to different outcomes in Portugal and Spain. Wage levels had decreased in Portugal and unemployment increased in the latter. The wage formation system and the definition of working conditions and collective bargaining are often pointed to as the reasons for this divergence, as they were centralized in Spain and extremely decentralized in Portugal (Amaral (1996) ).
While Portugal and Spain saw hard times during the regime transitions, Ireland deepened its economic integration and liberalization. However, the Irish government's response to the oil shock included a fiscal expansion, which increased the public debt (Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) ).
We describe in the next two paragraphs the economic measures taken to deal with the crisis.
In Spain the main political measures were an interventionist revenue policy (moderate wage growth, Peseta's depreciation, progressive taxation), an accommodative fiscal policy and restrictive monetary policy. The authorities implemented the reform of the declining sectors and the financial sector was liberalized. Although monetary policy was thought to be essential in controlling inflation, fiscal policy had been expansionary, increasing the deficit. The reforms were able to reduce inflation and to ease the external debt, but were not successful in relieving high unemployment and public deficit (Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996)).
Portugal sought IMF intervention in its enormous imbalance in external and public accounts. The success of the first stabilization program was modest because high inflation had outstripped the nominal depreciation. A crawling-peg system, which had been effective in the exchange rate stabilization, was implemented. Nevertheless, the second oil shock caused serious damage to the external deficits. A second IMF stabilization program, however, proved to be quite effective and prepared the economy to join the EEC in 1986
(César das Neves (1996) and Mateus, (1998) ).
By the mid-eighties, the Irish government had recognized that the expansionary fiscal policy was not helping the private sector and switched to contention in public budgets.
This was quite effective in reducing the interest rate and inflation, but it had some shortterm costs in terms of employment and growth (Fuente and X. Vives (1997) , Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) ).
Between 1974 and 1985, Ireland clearly overtook Portugal and Spain in economic growth rates, with an annual average of 3.8% against 2.2% and 1.8% respectively. In the following years the difference between growth performances increased, although all three countries experienced faster growth.
The adhesion of the Iberian countries to the EEC coincided with a global expansionary period. This favorable international environment and the macroeconomic stability turned out to be the best environment for investment. In Spain the effects in the labor market were clear: an employment creation rate of 3% per year that reduced the unemployment rate of about 22% in 1975 to 16% by 1990. Nevertheless, a combination of restrictive monetary and returns policies coupled with an expansionary fiscal policy put pressure on interest and inflation rates, which worsened the public and external deficits. In Portugal the macroeconomic stability was accompanied by a great push for public investment in infrastructures and by administration reforms, increasing the confidence of economic agents (César das Neves (1994 Neves ( , 1996 , Mateus (1998), Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996) ).
Regarding nominal adjustment, Portugal and Ireland reduced their inflation rates to near 2%, and Spain to near 5% during the nineties, but the employment costs were enormous in Ireland (7.5% rise in the unemployment rate) and Spain (5% rise in the unemployment rate) but quite moderate in Portugal (2% rise) (Mateus (1998) ) 6 . Nevertheless we can see some competitive effects: despite the increase in productivity, the attractiveness of Iberian products suffered from the appreciation of the Peseta and Escudo. The gradual wage increase and currency appreciation changed the competitive strengths of these two countries (Mateus (1998) , Prados de Escosura and Sanz (1996) ). One of the major problems of the Portuguese economy was the low qualification of its labor force and a specialization in low technology industries. For instance, OECD figures shows that the high-tech share in Portuguese exports was 3%, the lowest in Europe, against 28% in Ireland, the highest number in Europe (Mateus (1998) ).
Ireland has became an attractive destination for FDI and domestic investment, mainly because of the introduction of a credible fiscal policy and huge fiscal benefits for profits (not only profits from exports but also from all production). In addition, it accumulated over the past decades a stock of technically prepared human capital. However, Ireland faces some inefficiencies in its fiscal policies that may not conform to European competition Law (Fuente and X. Vives (1997) , Walsh (1999) , The Economist (1997)).
Some authors also argue that the massive entry of multinationals in its economy comes at the expense of some potential domestic entrants (H. Görg and E. Strobrl (2000) ).
During the period 1986-2001 Ireland benefited from one of the highest economic growth rates in the OECD, with an annual average of 6.1% against 3.5% and 3.2% for Portugal and Spain, respectively. The Golden Age has come to Ireland, 20 years after its Iberian counterparts.
In Table 2 we summarize the growth rates of these countries in different periods. In Table   3 we present the relative GDP between these countries and the USA in different years. In the next section we review growth accounting studies and try to summarize the sources of different growth paths between these three countries.
3.
Growth and Convergence Sources
Traditional growth-accounting 7 studies suggest that Spanish growth had a greater productivity increase component than did Portuguese growth, which was more capital intensive. Labor rarely contributed in a significant way to growth, except in the period 1974-79 in Portugal, and in the period 1986-90 in Spain (J. César das Neves (1994), L.
Prados de la Escosura and J.C. Sanz (1996) ). Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) studied relative growth in OECD countries and concluded that the catching-up process (the tendency for less developed countries to experience faster growth due to technology transfer from developed countries) was the main source of convergence in all three countries (Table 4) . 1950-60 1960-73 1973-85 1950-60 1960-73 1973-85 1950-60 1960-73 1973- The results are not optimistic towards the future of these countries, if the investment rates do not change. Nevertheless, high investment rates in technology and human capital in Ireland made this country the only one to benefit from a better position in the steady-state than in 1988, although this model does not include the period of faster growth of Ireland.
We must caution that investment rates are calculated over the short period 1983-85, which may not be representative of the entire trend, as it occurs in Portugal, for instance (see Figure 2 , above).
The most recent study is a simple growth accounting exercise that explicitly compares the three countries under consideration (Freitas (2000) 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 Ireland Portugal Spain 1960 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 Figure 1 shows the evolution of per capita relative income. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the ratio of investment to GDP. Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of school enrollment, investment in education and in R&D. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the ratio of public expenditure to GDP.
Figure 1 needs some remarks: (1) the income differential between Spain and Portugal derives from earlier periods. In this period, Portugal had slightly recovered some differential; (2) the differential between Ireland and OECD was smaller than the differential of the Iberian countries until the mid-sixties, when it was passed by Spain and then by Portugal. In 1992, Ireland had decreased the differential to lower levels than Portugal and Spain. More recent data show that Irish per capita income is indeed higher than the European Union mean (Leddin and Wash (1998) ).
The ratio of investment to GDP has been considered to be one of the most important variables in the growth process (Fuente (1995) ). Portugal has consistently showed the highest value for this variable, except in 1975 (see Figure 2) . Nevertheless, its recent decrease in Ireland does not appear to have negatively affected the growth rate there.
As for technological and human capital investment, Ireland has always occupied the pole position. In addition UNESCO data report that the proportion of university graduates in the labor force has remained greater in Ireland than in the other two countries from 1970 on. In 1995 this number was 2% in Ireland against 1.1% in Spain and 0.8% in Portugal (UNESCO (1999)).
A final important difference between Ireland and the Iberian countries is the share of public expenditure in GDP. Figure 5 shows that this share is sharply decreasing in Ireland after 1985, against an increase in tendency in Portugal and Spain. Table 6 shows the most important results of the model. When the model is divided into the periods (1970-1985 and 1985-1995) The main conclusions of the growth accounting exercises presented in our survey suggest that Portugal was the country that benefited least from increases in productivity, while
Ireland was the country where productivity and efficiency were most important. Portugal showed lower investment rates in technology and human capital than did Spain and
Ireland, but higher investment rates in physical capital. All studies point to convergence effects as the main factor that explains growth and convergence in these countries. The 10 It is said that an expansionary fiscal policy that has a positive effect on GDP growth is expansionary. This is a phenomenon that is supported by the Ricardian Equivalence effect. For more on this, see Romer (1996) . recent fiscal intervention in Ireland seems to have been crucial in improving growth, which may be a good signal to the other countries.
The absence of complete growth and convergence studies for the period before 1970 has left the puzzle unanswered: why did Ireland fail to converge until the seventies, despite the fact that it had all or more of the conditions to do so than its Iberian counterparts, and had adopted very similar structural policies?
4. Trying to address the puzzle: why did Ireland fail to converge until the seventies while Portugal and Spain did?
Some authors (Walsh (1993 (Walsh ( , 1999 , Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) , Fuente and Vives (1997) ) have tried to find reasons for the disappointing growth performance of Ireland up to the mid-eighties, when the main factors responsible for the current growth rates were already present at least from 1960 on.
It is consensual that the substitution-of-imports strategy of the fifties was detrimental to growth. However, Iberian countries were submitted to imports-substitution policies and experienced faster growth. In addition, the intense liberalization of Ireland in the sixties did not foster growth. Ó Gráda and O'Rourke (1996) argue that tariffs were replaced by nontrade policy measures, mainly by industrial subsidies and other incentives. This is indeed a factor that is associated with Ireland's present growth. Nevertheless, Walsh (1999) pointed out a crucial change in incentive policy: the introduction of more sophisticated objectives in the firms and industry selection and extension of the reduced tax to the non-trade sector (financial, for instance).
The tight trade link between the Irish economy and that of the United Kingdom, where growth rates were much lower than those of continental Europe, might be another factor that deterred Irish growth. However, Walsh (1993) demonstrated that after 1960 the growth rates in Ireland show a stronger correlation with those of OECD than those of the UK.
The same author argues that emigration has decreased effective human capital stock and so potential growth rates in Ireland may be overestimated. Nevertheless, he observes that the proportion of highly qualified emigrants had increased while total emigration decreased, which weakens his argument. On the other hand, it is interesting to analyze the composition of human capital. According to the same paper, a technological non-tertiary education system was created only at the beginning of the seventies. Until then, a great part of the educational system was controlled by the Church, which gave special attention to humanities and social sciences.
The last theory that may explain the puzzle is associated with institutional economics 11 . In fact, Olson argues with a lack of disruptive factors, there is a strong tendency for an increase in the influence of lobbies. The great majority of historians agree that the agrarian revolutions of the XIX century mantained the same institutions and industrial and commercial relations in Ireland. Ó Gráda and O'Rourke argue that some Irish institutions supported the inefficient allocation of resources to benefit some groups in the society. They argue, for instance, that the wage negotiation system was detrimental to growth. Durkan 12 concluded that centralized negotiations favored high wage growth. Between 1960 and Ireland adopted, in a discontinued form, centralized wage negotiations, provoking productivity losses when compared with other countries. In contrast, recently Walsh (1999) argued that the credible return to centralized negotiation processes had contributed to moderate wage growth.
Nevertheless, the comparison between Ireland and Iberian countries may be interesting, as Spain had centralized collective bargaining but Portugal did not. Olson 13 argues that authoritarian systems pay attention to the macroeconomic environment and avoid struggles between labor unions, giving rise to slow wage growth, which is one of the necessary growth conditions, according to Eichengreen (1996) . However, decentralized negotiations in Portugal allowed higher volatilities in wage growth than in Spain, which means that wages grew more in expansions and decreased more in recessions than they did with Spanish centralized bargaining. This means that labor market rigidities are stronger in Spain than in Portugal.
In spite of that, when we compare wage growth with productivity growth, it is shown that Ireland had labor productivity losses compared to its Iberian counterparts. The analysis of net productivity, defined as the growth rate of labor productivity less the growth rate of wages, is intuitive. The rational entrepreneurial decision must be based on net marginal productivity: the marginal increase in output less the marginal increase in labor costs from an additional unit of labor in productive activities. Table 7 shows that Ireland faced labor productivity losses until 1972, becoming positive (productivity gains) after that year and even increased the gains in the following period (1961-73 and 1986-96 in Portugal) , and diverged under labor productivity gains. These same data suggest a strong relevance of the labor component in Ireland, as this country had diverged under labor productivity losses. This is in line with Dowrick and Nguyen's study (see Table 4 ), which points out a labor contribution of more than 40% to differential growth rates (which are negative) in Ireland between 1950 and 60 and more than 120% between 1960 and 70. The labor contribution is less significant in the Iberian countries until 1973 (between 4% and 9% for Portugal and between -5% and 24% for Spain). As the link between convergence and labor growth is strong, it may be argued that Ireland showed divergence until 1985 due to decreasing net labor productivity.
13 See C. Ó Gráda and K. O'Rourke (1996) . 14 This is defined as the difference between labor productivity growth rate and real wages growth rate.
Such an influence of the labor component on growth in Dowrick and Nguyen's model may result from two sources: (1) the growth rate of the labor force is negative or (2) response of GDP growth rates to the labor growth rates is high or, in other words, the elasticity of output to labor is high 15 . We have found some support for this argument in data. In fact, the mean growth rates of labor force and employment between 1960 and 1971 were -0.06%
and -0.05% each year (-0.72% and -0.66% over the entire decade) and shares of labor in this decade were near 70%, which is quite a high value for the time. The same variables for
Iberian countries show remarkable differences. Employment and labor force increased throughout the decade by nearly 2% for Portugal and 8% for Spain. The share of labor in the national income was near 50% for Portugal and 60% for Spain 16 .
If we observe Fuente and Vives' results (see Table 6 ), it is even more evident that the labor force component was of greater importance in Ireland than in Iberian countries throughout the period. Had human capital been taken into account, the difference would be even more pronounced.
To conclude, immoderate wage growth (when compared to productivity), together with the significant contribution of labor to convergence in Ireland, can be a candidate for an explanation to our puzzle of Ireland's poor performance during the sixties.
Conclusion
Despite 
Methodological Notes
We provide here details on the methodological approaches followed to generate the empirical results presented in the text. For details on sources and data we refer to the literature.
General Growth Accounting
The standard procedure for growth accounting starts with the neoclassical production function
where A is the level of technology, K is the capital stock and L is the quantity of labor. As is well known, the growth rate of output can be partitioned into components associated with factor accumulation and technological progress. Differentiation of equation (1) with respect to time yields, after division by Y and rearrangement of terms:
where
If the technology factor appears in a Hicks-neutral
If factors are paid their social marginal products (this is almost always assumed) so that F K = r and F L = w, then (2) can be written as
where g is obtained by difference as shown, and the other quantities derive from national accounts.
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2 Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) The estimated equation is
The decomposition of variations in the growth of trend per capita GDP (q − p) is derived algebraically from (4):
where q i is the average annual rate of growth in trend per capita GDP I/Q is the average investment ratio Y 0 is initial income l is employment growth rate p is the population growth rate δ is the regression estimate of the coefficient on initial income b is the regression estimate of the coefficient on employment a is the regression estimate of the coefficient on investment rate
The Þrst three terms on the right hand side of (5) are the contributions to variations in GDP growth rates from catch-up, employment deepening and capital deepening, respectively.
3 Fuente (1995) The undelying production function is Y = ΦK α (AL) 1−α = ΦALZ α , with Z = K/AL and Φ = Z µ .
A is an index of labor augmenting technical progress and K denotes a broad capital aggregate. The growth rate of A, g a , is an increasing function of the proportion of GDP spent in R&D. This is the R&D mechanism in the model. Adding human capital to the model (with coefficient β in the production function and the same rate of depreciation as physical capital) and letting s k and s h denote the rates of investment on physical and human capital, respectively, the convergence equation (which was also the estimated equation) can be written as q it = g x + λx 0 + λg x t − λq it + λ(α + µ)
where q it is the growth rate of output per worker in country i at time t s k is the rate of investment in physical capital s h is the rate of investment in human capital θ is R&D expenditure (x 0 − a i 0 ) is the initial gap with respect to best practice technology, where (x 0 −a l 0 ) is the gap between the leader and the technological frontier. This assumes some values in the estimation. An assumed value of 0 means that the technological leader is at the technological frontier.
(a l 0 − a i 0 ) is the gap with respect to the leader λ measures the speed of convergence of income per efficiency unit of labor towards its steady-state value η is the speed of technological diffusion (catch-up) g x is the technological growth rate at the technological frontier. It is exogenous and constant by deÞnition.
4 Fuente and Vives (1997) The underlying production function is now more complex:
The crucial differences between (6) and (8) are the terms Θ and R, which correspond to the explicit introduction of endogenous R&D and Þscal policy as production factors in this setting. The Þrst factor was already considered in the last setting but in a seemingly different way. The latter was only now introduced.
The convergence equation that derives from (8) is the following:
+ α h ln s h it δ + g x + n + α r ln s r it δ + g x + n¸+ (9)
This convergence equation is almost equal to (7), except for the simpler speciÞcation of the convergence and catch-up processes, which correspond to the terms βy 0 and βa it , respectively. As the authors explain, if technology diffuses across countries at a sufficiently rapid pace, those economies which are technically less advanced at the beginning of the period should grow faster than the rest. This effect, however, will gradually exhaust itself as each country approaches an equilibrium level of relative technical efficiency. To try to capture this effect, they have included a dummy for initially backward countries (Spain, Ireland, Greece and Japan) and the product of this variable by a trend. As the authors work with data on income per capita rather than output per worker, they include in the equation the increase in unemployment (DU) and labor force participation rates (GTAC), as changes in these variables would affect income per capita with a constant level of output per employed worker.
Thus the estimated equation was:
q it = g x + c 1 t + c 2 t 2 + c 3 DLAG5 + c 4 (DLAG5)t + c a GT AC it + c u DU it
· · α k ln s k it δ + g x + n + α h ln s h it δ + g x + n + α r ln s r it δ + g x + n¸+ +γ( · θ it + (δ + g x + n)θ it )
The Þrst elements in the equation (a constant, a trend and a trend squared and the terms which include the dummy DLAG5) try to approximate the term g + βa it , which appears in equation (9).
